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In the first decade of the twenty-first century, China 
consolidated its position as a global economic power 
and the projection of its very wide-ranging influence. 
The six-monthly reports produced by the International 
Monetary Fund (imf) and other multilateral agencies 
and research centres were already showing that Chinese 
growth, in conjunction with the expansion of the United 
States economy, accounted over half of the rate of growth 
of world income in the 2003-2008 cycle.1 The current 
crisis has not altered this situation. On the contrary, the 
vigorous performance of the Chinese economy was 
reaffirmed in 2009, when its gross domestic product 
(gdp) grew by 8.7%;2 and with its economy projected to 
grow at rates of 9% - and 10% over the next few years, 
while the world’s mature economies remain difficulty, 
China will continue to climb the international ranking.3 
Against this backdrop, various studies are being 
undertaken to evaluate the repercussions on Latin America 
 The opinions expressed in this article are the authors’ exclusive 
responsibility and do not necessarily coincide with the official position 
of the institutions to which they are affiliated.
1 See http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=29 (access in May 
2010, “China Quarterly Update” published periodically by the World 
Bank (http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/
EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/CHINAEXTN/0,contentMDK:20652127~
pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:318950,00.html, viewed in 
May 2010); The annual Trade and Development Report published by 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (unctad) 
and the Annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements (bis), 
among other publications. 
2 In 1990, China’s gdp represented 4.2% of the world total, measured 
in purchasing power parity (ppp) dollars. In 2009, the proportion had 
grown to 12.5%. 
3 On the rise of China, see, among others, Goldman Sachs (2007); 
Bijian (2006); Kang (2007); Naughton (2007); Kurlantzick (2007); 
National Intelligence Council (2008).
of China’s rise to world power status.4 This article forms 
part of that line of research, with an analysis that focuses 
on the period subsequent to the world financial crisis. A 
number of indicators are constructed of the performance 
of Brazilian and Chinese exports in the region. The 
analysis starts from a Brazilian perspective in which 
the Latin American market, particularly South America, 
has been vital for absorbing Brazil’s manufactured 
exports. It can clearly be seen that Chinese exports 
are advancing into the spaces previously occupied by 
Brazilian suppliers. The article’s main hypothesis is 
that China will seek to maintain diversified destination 
markets, while gradually reducing its reliance on the 
industrialized countries, which have been hit harder 
by the global financial crisis. In the framework of a 
“new normality”, emerging country markets, including 
Latin American ones, are likely to be more vigorously 
contested (Gross, 2009; Spence, 2009), and this could 
displace Brazilian manufactured exports still further. 
It is argued that exports are the key to keeping China’s 
internationalization strategy active, and thus guarantee 
stability in the country’s modernization path.5
Following this brief introduction, the article is 
divided into three sections. Section II reviews the 
performance of Chinese exports worldwide in recent 
years, while section III compares the performance of 
Chinese and Brazilian exports in Latin America and 
identifies potential sectors in which Chinese exports 
could render Brazil less competitive. Final comments 
are made in section IV. 
4 Castro (2008); caf (2006); Devlin, Estevadeordal and Rodríguez-
Clare (2006); Lederman, Olarreaga and Perry (2008); eclac (2009).
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The first decade of the twenty-first century saw China 
become a member of the World Trade Organization 
(wto) in 2001, as foreign trade and financial flows from 
that country increased sharply as a proportion of world 
totals (Naughton, 2007; Goldman Sachs, 2007; unctad 
(2009; eclac, 2009; Sen, 2010). This section seeks to 
analyse a number of aspects of that involvement and 
recent changes. The analysis starts from two empirical 
findings relating to the period 1981-2009. Firstly, since 
mid-1999, Chinese gdp growth has surpassed the average 
for the reference period, without a deterioration in the 
contribution made by its net exports to gdp growth 
(see figure 1).6 This stands in contrast to the pattern of 
6 Net exports are defined as the balance between exports and imports 
of goods and non-factor services in local currency. The contribution 
previous years, when the acceleration in growth reduced 
the external sector’s contribution to the country’s overall 
economic performance. Secondly, as seen in figure 1, 
and particularly figure 2, since 2007 there has been a 
pronounced contraction in the contribution made by 
exports to income growth. Gross fixed capital formation 
(gfcf) now seems to be driving Chinese growth.7 
made by net exports to gdp growth represents the percentage directly 
contributed by that aggregate to the rate of income growth. Thus, 
a negative value would indicate a negative contribution to the gdp 
growth rate, whereas a positive value would represent a positive 
contribution. The source of the raw data is Euromonitor International 
(www.eromonitor.com). 
7 On the debate over the factors driving Chinese growth, see, for 
example, Prasad and Rajan (2006); Naughton (2007); Sen (2010); 
Felipe and others (2010).
II
The performance of Chinese  
exports in world trade
FIGURE 1
China: Difference between the average and annual rates of gdp growth and 
contribution of net exports to gdp growth, 1981-2009
(Percentages)
Source: Euromonitor International (www.eromonitor.com). 
Note: Diff_gdp: Difference between average and annual gdp growth rates.
































































































Growth without balance of payments pressureGrowth with balance of payments pressure
58
thE PERfoRmAnCE of ChInEsE And bRAzILIAn ExPoRts to LAtIn AmERICA, 1994-2009  • 
mARCos tAdEu CAPutI LéLIs, AndRé moREIRA CunhA And mAnuELA gomEs dE LImA
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 6  •  A P R I L  2 0 1 2
Nonetheless, from strategic standpoint,8 the external 
sector is a key factor in the dynamism of Chinese growth.9 
Job creation and the generation of income and investments 
linked to the export sector are cited as key elements of 
that country’s modernization process (Rodrik, 2006; 
Bijian, 2006; Naughton, 2007; Sen, 2010; Felipe and 
others, 2010). Although its larger net creditor position 
— stemming from a substantial accumulation of assets 
denominated in foreign currencies during recent years — 
8 See Yufan Hao, Wei and Dittmer (2009).
9 Export growth is assumed to provide two basic benefits to an economy’s 
development process (McCombie and Thirlwall, 1993; Thirlwall, 2003). 
The first of these relate to the effects on the process of expanding 
material prosperity in society and can be subdivided into two aspects: (i) 
exports are directly related to higher income in society; and (ii) export 
growth can create a virtuous circle of economic expansion based on 
the link between the production growth and productivity increase. The 
second benefit concerns the capacity to increase the country’s income 
without putting pressure on the balance of payments. In other words, 
a continuous export growth dynamic makes it possible to finance the 
region’s internal demand for imported goods through its own external 
sales, thereby facilitating rapid economic development in the country 
and reducing reliance on financing through the capital and financial 
account. In the last few years, the external financial constraint has not 
posed a major problem for China (Bijian, 2006), among other things 
because positive net exports contribute to achieving a net creditor 
external position.
has mitigated balance-of-payments sustainability risks, 
the deterioration of the trade account is permanently 
monitored by Chinese economic policymakers. In 
the years before the period of economic expansion in 
the first decade of the twenty-first century, productive 
modernization depended on access to foreign currency, 
guaranteed by both exports and borrowing, together with 
access to foreign investment (Wu, 2005). 
As noted in the introduction, this article sees the quest 
for new export markets as crucial to China’s development 
strategy. Consequently, despite the downtrend in China’s 
net exports, its traditional markets, particularly the 
United States and Europe, are expected to continue to 
face economic difficulties in the next few years. In that 
context, and given Latin America’s economic growth 
prospects for the next few years, this region is becoming 
a target for the expansion of China’s external sales. Based 
on these premises, it is interesting to note the spread 
of China’s trade before and after the world financial 
crisis, for which various indicators are calculated of the 
performance of China’s international trade. 
The first of these is China’s trade intensity index 
(tii) with specific regions: United States, Asia, excluding 
Hong Kong (Special Administrative Region of China), 
Macau and Taiwan Province of China, the euro zone, 
FIGURE 2
China: Contribution of gfcf and exports to gdp growth and  
their respective two-year moving averages, 1999-2009
(Percentages)
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the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland,10 Africa and Latin America, except for Brazil.11 

















Where: mi,j = Imports of country i from country j; 
Mi,w = Imports of country i from the world; xj,w = Exports 
from country j to the world; Xw,w = Total world exports.
This index shows the extent to which exports from 
region j to region i are greater (or less) than expected, 
10 The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was 
included in the analysis because it does not belong to the euro zone, 
and because there has been a substantial movement in the trend of 
China’s tii with that group. 
11  In this article, Latin America, excluding Brazil, is defined as 
comprising the following countries: Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of), Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of). 
given the relative importance of region j in international 
trade. A value above 1 indicates that the exports of j to 
i are greater than expected, given share of region j in 
international purchases.12 Figure 3 shows the Chinese 
economy’s tii with the regions mentioned between 
1994 and 2008.13 The vertical dotted lines represent the 
difference between the minimum and maximum values 
of trade intensity recorded each year. 
In general, China’s trade intensity has increased 
with regions that had lower index at the start of the 
reference period, and there is a movement en bloc. At 
the same time, there is a slight reduction in the Chinese 
economy’s tii with regions displaying a high index at 
the outset, thereby reducing the tii differential between 
regions. As a counterpart, the tii with the euro zone 
remained virtually stable. Nonetheless, non-European 
12 For further details see Hoekman, Mattoo and English (2002). 
13 Figure 3 uses data from the United Nations Commodity Trade 
Statistics Database (comtrade). As consolidated data for 2009 
were not available, that year is excluded. This also applies to other 
information obtained from this source. 
FIGURE 3
China: Trade intensity index (tii) with selected regions, 1994-2008
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Database (comtrade).
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Union countries face well-known difficulties in increasing 
their trade intensity with that bloc, since that indicator 
is a relative measure of the intensity of exports from 
one region to another. Consequently, given the trade 
intensity within the bloc and the dynamic of openness 
to new markets for Chinese exports, the index ultimately 
remains constant. Nonetheless, the proportion of imports 
from China in the euro zone’s total global purchases grew 
in absolute terms from 1.9% in 1994 to 6.3% in 2008. 
Despite the increased share of Chinese products in the 
euro zone’s external purchases, the equivalent proportion 
grew more strongly in other regions, specifically in the 
United Kingdom, Africa and Latin America. Accordingly, 
the movements of those three regions are highlighted 
in figure 3. 
Table 1 shows details of the deconcentration dynamic 
of China’s export destinations, which to some extent 
could be discerned in the tii and indicated in figure 3.14 
For that purpose the concentration ratio (cr) is used, 
which represents the share of the main trade partners in 
China’s total exports. The value of cr(1) represents the 
share of China’s exports sent to its main trading partner, 
while cr(2) represents the same indicator for the two 
leading partners, and so on. 
The cr(15) index shows a sharp deconcentration in 
China’s export destinations, with this trend intensifying 
after 1999, defined above as “Growth without balance 
of payments pressure”. The deconcentration dynamic 
seems to have been provided mainly by the movement 
recorded within cr(2). Moreover, despite the increasing 
intensity of China’s trade with the African continent and 
with Latin America, no country from those regions is 
included in the 15 main destinations for China’s exports. 
This shows that the growth in China’s trade intensity 
with Latin America and Africa occurred without causing 
major alterations in its preferential export destinations. 
In other words, China’s external sales are consolidating 
in its main destinations, while gaining new positions in 
international trade at the same time. 
This demonstrates the exceptional capacity of the 
Chinese economy to expand its export supply, given the 
size of its workforce and rate of growth of his productive 
base.15 Figure 4 shows that these movements occurred 
14 The reader is reminded that China’s trade with Hong Kong (Special 
Administrative Region of China), Macao and Taiwan Province of 
China is excluded.
15 Deutsche Bank data estimate the average annual growth of China’s 
investments at 12% between 1990 and 2009, and 14.5% per year 
between 2001 and 2009. Industrial production also grew by an average 
of 10% per year over the last 20 years (http://www.dbresearch.de, 
viewed in May 2010). 
without causing China’s exports to become more sectorally 
concentrated. The index of the sectoral concentration of 
exports used is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (hhi), 




















Where: xj,k = Exports of sector k by country j; Xj,w = 
Worldwide exports from country j.
On the scale of this indicator, a result below 1,000 
means a low concentration, whereas an hhi between 
1,000 and 1,800 reflects moderate concentration, and a 
16 The indicator was calculated on the basis of the sectors defined by the 
National Classification of Economic Activities (cnae), at the two-digit 
level. In the 1990s, the cnae was developed by the Brazilian Institute 
of Geography and Statistics (ibge) in conjunction with administrative 
record-keeping agencies, for the purpose of standardizing Brazil’s 
economic data. The reference used in preparing the cnae was the 
International Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic 
Activities (isic), produced by the United Nations Statistics Division.
TABLE 1
China: Concentration index (cr)  
1995, 1999, 2004, 2008 and 2009
(Percentages)
China in the world
  1995 1999 2004 2008 2009
cr(1) 25.2 26.5 25.4 20.4 21.3
cr(2) 47.1 47.0 40.3 29.8 30.7
cr(3) 53.1 52.0 46.0 35.7 35.9
cr(4) 58.1 56.9 50.8 40.5 40.7
cr(5) 61.2 60.3 54.5 44.2 44.2
cr(10) 72.8 72.5 66.8 57.1 57.1
cr(15) 79.9 79.1 75.1 66.5 66.4
Main destinations – rank
United States 2 1 1 1 1
Japan 1 2 2 2 2
Republic of Korea 3 3 3 3 3
Germany 4 4 4 4 4
Netherlands 6 5 5 5 5
England 8 6 6 6 6
Singapore 5 7 8 8 7
India 23 21 17 9 8
France 10 9 9 13 9
Australia 13 11 12 14 10
Taiwan Province of China 7 8 7 11 11
Italy 9 10 10 10 12
Malaysia 16 16 14 16 13
United Arab Emirates 17 18 15 12 14
Canada 14 12 13 15 15
Source: Global Trade Information Services (gtis).
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higher value indicates an export schedule concentrated 
in few sectors. For further details of the hhi see Resende 
and Boff (2002). 
The concentration of China’s total external sales 
vary between a minimum of 675 and a maximum of 820 
in the reference period, reaching a level of 763 in 2008. 
This represents a low-concentration model. There was a 
significant change in the hhi of China’s exports to the 
United States and the euro zone between 2002 and 2005. 
Given the changes in the relative importance of 
the different sectors in the Chinese export basket, the 
composition of external sales in terms of technological 
intensity changed between 1996 and 2008,17 as shown 
in table 2. 
The proportion of labour-intensive products in 
China’s export basket declined considerably between 
1996 and 2008. At the same time there has been increase 
17 See the methodology described by Pavitt (1984), expanded by 
Holland and Xavier (2004). 
in manufactures produced by specialized suppliers, goods 
intensive in economies of scale and those intensive in 
research and development (r&d). The sectors indicated 
as manufactures produced by specialist suppliers relate to 
specially commissioned capital goods. Goods intensive 
in economies of scale include the automotive, iron and 
steel industries, along with consumer electronics (mainly 
video, audio, and white-line appliances). China’s exports 
are dominated by the sectors manufacturing radio and 
television receivers and sound and video reproduction, 
recording or amplification, and the manufacture of 
electrical appliances. Sectors involving r&d-intensive 
products are fine chemicals, electronic components, 
telecommunications, and the aerospace industry. The 
sector manufacturing telephony and radio telephony 
apparatus and equipment, and television and radio 
transmitters, accounts for the largest share of China’s 
external sales. This reflects another distinctive feature 
of China’s performance in world trade: the capacity to 
add value to products in the export basket in a relatively 
short space of time. 
FIGURE 4
China: Herfindahl-Hirschman index of sectoral concentration  
of the export schedule, 1994-2008





















































World Asia United States Euro zone
62
thE PERfoRmAnCE of ChInEsE And bRAzILIAn ExPoRts to LAtIn AmERICA, 1994-2009  • 
mARCos tAdEu CAPutI LéLIs, AndRé moREIRA CunhA And mAnuELA gomEs dE LImA
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 6  •  A P R I L  2 0 1 2
The previous section highlighted China’s capacity to 
diversify its export markets and products and add greater 
value to its export basket. Given these characteristics, 
this section seeks to compare the recent path of Brazilian 
and Chinese exports in Latin America, to determine 
whether Brazilian exports risk being displaced in the 
region as a result of China’s expansion. The initial 
analysis focuses on industrial exports. Figure 5 shows 
the estimated trend of the value of exports from sectors 
related industry in the Brazilian and Chinese economies 
to Latin American countries (in billions of dollars).18 The 
periods in which there were changes in those trends are 
also indicated. It should be remembered that indicators 
showing the relation between the Chinese economy and 
Latin American countries do not include Brazil. 
When estimating the behaviour of the trend in a given 
time series, components associated with irregularities, 
seasonality, and cycles are eliminated to obtain a more 
robust observation of the movement of the series. Both 
the trend of Brazilian manufactured exports to Latin 
America (Brazilian trend), and the trend of Chinese 
exports to the same destination (Chinese trend) moved 
18 The statistical method used to estimate the trend is that applied in 
univariate structural time-series models. For further details see Harvey 
(1989); Commandeur and Koopman (2007). 
sharply upward as from 2003, when the region started 
to grow more vigorously (eclac, 2009). Nonetheless, 
since the second quarter of 2007, the value of the trend 
of China’s industrial exports to Latin America has 
surpassed the equivalent aggregate for the Brazilian 
economy. Figure 6 more clearly illustrates the dynamic 
of the difference between the two trends. The positive 
values indicate that the trend of Brazilian exports is 
above the trend of Chinese exports, whereas negative 
values indicate the reverse. 
Figure 6 also shows that in 2009, when the global 
crisis had a major dampening effect on international 
trade, the difference between the Brazilian and Chinese 
trends was narrowing. The same conclusion arises from 
figure 5, which shows that the difference in the two 
trends widens in the initial recovery following the crisis.
Having evaluated the behaviour of industrial exports 
based on the respective trends, the analysis now focuses 
on the Chinese and Brazilian trade intensity indices with 
Latin America. The aggregate used to calculate this index 
is each country’s’ total exports to the Latin American 
region excluding Brazil. Table 3 shows China’s and 
Brazil’s tii with Latin American countries, and each 
country’s share in Latin America’s external purchases.
Although the Chinese trend outperformed Brazil’s, 
China’s trade intensity with Latin America is still less 
TABLE 2




1996 2008 1996 2008
Commodities 8.7 2.8 9.3 24.6
Natural-resource-intensive products 10.4 8.2 17.9 14.7
Labour-intensive manufactures 44.9 26.9 21.0 8.5
Economies-of-scale-intensive manufactures 17.1 22.7 12.6 9.2
Manufactures produced by specialized suppliers 10.5 22.9 26.0 17.0
R&D-intensive manufactures 7.7 16.3 13.1 25.7
Unclassified 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.4
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Global Trade Information Services (gtis). 
III
The performance of Chinese and Brazilian 
exports in Latin America
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FIGURE 5
Estimated trend of Brazilian and Chinese industrial exports to Latin America, 
quarterly data from 1997 to 2009
(Billions of dollars) 
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FIGURE 6
Difference between the trends of Brazilian and Chinese exports to Latin America, 
quarterly data from 1997 to 2009 
(Billions of dollars) 
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than Brazil’s. The tii between Brazil and Latin American 
countries shows that trade between that region and the 
Brazilian economy is almost five times as large as Brazil’s 
global trade ratio. That value does not increase steadily 
during the reference period, rising from 6.1% in 1994 to 
6.9% in 2008. In contrast, the specific nature of China’s 
tii with Latin America displays a substantial increase 
between 1994 and 2008, attaining a value of 1.13 in the 
latter year. In other words, the trade intensity between 
the Chinese economy and Latin American countries is 
similar to that registered between China and the world at 
large. Despite Brazil’s greater trade intensity with Latin 
America compared to China’s with the same region, 
China has the larger market share. 
Table 4 shows the concentration index of China’s 
export destinations to Latin America excluding Brazil. 
In 2009, 92% of China’s exports were sent to 10 Latin 
American markets, with 67.2% being absorbed by the 
four leading economies. Those figures suggest extremely 
high concentration, which strengthened further between 
1995 and 2009. Nonetheless, between 2004 and 2009, 
the share of the three leading destinations for Chinese 
exports (cr(3)) in Latin America (excluding Brazil) 
decreased by 6%. This suggests a slight deconcentration 
TABLE 3
China’s and Brazil’s tii with Latin America 
and the proportion of imports from those 




iic Share (%) iic Share (%)
1994 0.25 0.8 5.22 6.1
1995 0.38 1.2 5.58 5.6
1996 0.42 1.3 5.84 5.6
1997 0.43 1.6 5.44 5.7
1998 0.49 1.7 5.29 5.3
1999 0.53 1.9 4.78 4.3
2000 0.58 2.4 4.96 4.5
2001 0.69 3.1 4.56 4.5
2002 0.74 3.8 4.16 4.0
2003 0.88 5.3 5.11 5.1
2004 1.00 6.7 5.81 6.4
2005 0.95 7.2 5.92 7.1
2006 1.06 8.8 5.77 6.9
2007 1.02 9.5 5.52 6.7
2008 1.13 11.0 5.11 6.9
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database 
(comtrade).
a Excluding Brazil in both cases.
tii: Trade intensity index.
TABLE 4
China: Export concentration ratio (cr) to Latin America,  
1995, 1999, 2004, 2008 and 2009
(Percentages)
China: Exports to Latin America 
(Excluding Brazil) 
1995 1999 2004 2008 2009
cr(1) 26.2 24.9 36.3 27.6 30.3
cr(2) 44.2 43.9 52.2 43.3 46.4
cr(3) 56.2 58.4 64.6 55.6 58.6
cr(4) 64.8 70.3 70.8 65.7 67.2
cr(5) 71.2 75.9 75.4 72.3 74.1
cr(6) 77.6 79.7 79.7 78.3 80.0
cr(7) 82.3 83.2 82.8 83.8 85.2
cr(8) 85.3 86.3 85.6 86.9 87.7
cr(9) 87.6 88.8 88.1 89.6 90.1
cr(10) 89.7 91.3 90.5 91.6 92.0
Main destinations - rank
Mexico 4 2 1 1 1
Panama 1 1 2 2 2
Chile 2 3 3 3 3
Argentina 3 4 4 4 4
Venezuela (Bolivarian Rep. of) 8 6 6 5 5
Colombia 9 9 5 6 6
Peru 6 8 7 7 7
Ecuador 12 16 9 8 8
Cuba 5 5 10 9 9
Uruguay 10 7 13 10 10
Source: Global Trade Information Services (gtis).
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trend in destinations the of China’s export to Latin 
American countries. 
To compare the concentration ratio of Brazilian and 
Chinese export destinations in Latin America, table 5 
shows the corresponding indicator for the Brazilian 
economy. As in the case of China, Brazilian export 
destinations in Latin American countries are becoming 
more concentrated, particularly in Argentina. Nonetheless, 
the path of cr(3) shows a smaller deconcentration trend 
than in the Chinese case. The deconcentration trend of 
Chinese exports in the three leading Latin American 
destinations is greater than that achieved by Brazil. 
In addition, Brazilian exports to Latin America are 
mostly sent to South American countries, with nine of the 
10 leading destinations for Brazil’s external sales to Latin 
American countries in that region. Mexico, which is the 
only exception and was the second leading destination 
for Brazil’s exports to Latin American countries in 1999 
and 2004, was ranked fourth in 2008 and third in 2009 
—the year in which the repercussions of international 
crisis were felt. The dynamic of China’s exports to 
Latin American countries is more decentralized, with 
one country from each region among its three leading 
destinations: North America, Central America and 
South America. 
Brazil’s top two export markets in Latin America 
are also among China’s three main destinations in 
South America (excluding Brazil). As can be seen in 
table 3, variations in the structure of China’s exports 
in the South American region may have been one of 
the factors that prevented Brazil from increasing its 
share in the total external purchases of Latin American 
countries. Here it is worth noting the trend of the ranking 
of China and Brazil in the total imports of Argentina 
and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. In the case 
of Argentina, imports from Brazil grew by an average 
of 9.2% per year between 2004 and 2009. In contrast, 
the same indicator for China reports 40.6% annual 
growth over the same period The share of Brazilian 
products in Argentina’s total imports fell from 34.6% to 
30.9%, whereas the proportion of imports from China 
increased from 4.1% to 13.0% between 2004 and 2009. 
Table 6 gives details of subsectors19 in which the share 
of imports from Brazil declined substantially, as the 
 
19 The subsectors category used in this section corresponds to the 
three-digit breakdown of the National Classification of Economic 
Activities (cnae), obtained from the International Standard Industrial 
Classification (isic) produced by the United Nations.
TABLE 5
Brazil: Concentration ratio (cr) of exports to Latin America,  
1997,1999, 2004, 2008 and 2009
(Percentages)
Brazil: Exports to Latin America
1997 1999 2004 2008 2009
cr(1) 47.6 48.6 34.9 38.9 41.0
cr(2) 57.5 58.3 53.7 50.3 52.5
cr(3) 65.9 66.4 65.8 60.9 61.1
cr(4) 72.1 73.1 72.7 70.4 69.7
cr(5) 77.9 79.2 77.6 75.9 75.4
cr(6) 83.3 84.1 81.8 80.9 80.8
cr(7) 88.4 88.1 84.9 86.1 85.6
cr(8) 91.5 91.7 87.9 89.7 89.9
cr(9) 94.5 94.1 90.4 92.2 92.9
cr(10) 96.5 95.3 92.8 94.1 94.9
Main destinations - rank
Argentina 1 1 1 1 1
Venezuela (Bolivarian Rep. of) 6 6 4 2 2
Mexico 5 2 2 4 3
Chile 3 3 3 3 4
Colombia 8 8 5 7 5
Paraguay 2 4 6 5 6
Peru 9 9 8 6 7
Uruguay 4 5 7 8 8
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 7 7 9 9 9
Ecuador 11 11 10 10 10
Source: Global Trade Information Services (gtis).
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share of imports from the Chinese economy grew in the 
total imports of the subsector by the Argentine market. 
Increases in the share of imports from China 
compared to those from Brazil have occurred particularly 
in labour-intensive subsectors (manufacture of textile 
products, footwear and furniture items) and electro-
electronics generally. From the Brazilian standpoint, 
the situation of exports to the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, its second ranked destination in Latin America, 
is more worrying than that of Argentina. Between 2004 
and 2009, imports from Brazil grew at an average 
annual rate of 16.5%. In contrast, Chinese exports to the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela grew by an average 
of over 54% per year. Thus, while the share of imports 
from Brazil decreased from 8.3% of Venezuela’s total 
imports in 2003 to 7.4% in 2009, the share of imports 
from China grew from 2.9% to 10.6% in the same period. 
In 2009, the year in which the international economic 
crisis worsened, the share of imports from China in the 
Venezuelan market grew by 0.8%, whereas the share of 
imports from Brazil decreased by around 0.9%. Table 7 
shows the main subsectors in which imports of Brazilian 
origin lost share and those from China gained, compared 
to the total external purchases by the subsector in question 
in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
These figures reveal two specific features of China’s 
exports to Brazil’s two leading markets in Latin America. 
The first relates to the capacity to gain positions with 
respect to Brazilian exports in an international crisis 
setting. This dynamic had been mentioned above when 
describing the trend of China’s exports of industrial 
products in all Latin American countries, as shown 
in figure 5. The second specific feature concerns its 
expansion capacity in most industrial subsectors. This 
is even clearer when comparing the results shown in 
tables 6 and 7, which show a considerable number of 
non-coinciding subsectors in the economies of Argentina 
and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. That situation 
had been noted in the previous section, dealing with 
the performance of China’s exports worldwide. To 
demonstrate the sectoral deconcentration capacity of 
China’s exports in Latin American countries, figure 7 
shows the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of Chinese and 
Brazilian external sales to Latin American countries. 
Brazilian exports to Latin American countries 
reveal a slight sectoral deconcentration trend. In 2009, 
53.8% of those exports were concentrated in four sectors, 
namely manufacture and assembly of motor vehicles, 
trailers and chassis (22.6%); manufacture of chemical 
products (11.1%); machinery and equipment (10.7%); 
and basic metallurgy (9.4%). In terms of the dynamic 
of Chinese exports, there is a sector deconcentration 
movement associated with a change in composition, 
with higher value-added sectors gaining importance. 
The accumulation of value in China’s exports to 
Latin American countries is clear, since in the first 
year of the series, the main sectors were clothing 
manufacture and accessories (21.2%); manufacture 
TABLE 6
Argentina: Share and variation in the share of imports from Brazil  
and China in total imports of selected subsectors, 2004 and 2009
(Percentages)
Subsectors
Brazil China Variation in share
2004 2009 2004 2009 Brazil China
Fabrics - including yarn and fabric 47.7 32.6 3.5 33.8 -15.1 30.3
Textile articles 87.0 63.6 1.3 15.7 -23.4 14.4
Woollen fabrics and articles 38.7 9.9 1.0 61.7 -28.8 60.8
Clothing manufacture 37.0 8.6 4.8 43.7 -28.4 38.9
Footwear 74.4 55.4 10.2 27.7 -19.1 17.5
Pharmaceuticals 14.2 6.8 10.6 20.4 -7.4 9.8
Ceramics 42.0 30.3 8.5 26.0 -11.7 17.5
Electrical appliances 49.7 35.1 15.0 34.0 -14.5 19.0
Electrical generators, transformers and motors 21.0 12.2 5.8 12.8 -8.8 7.0
Insulated electrical wires, cables and conductors 53.8 29.1 3.6 22.4 -24.7 18.8
Lamps and lighting equipment 26.5 12.2 30.9 60.4 -14.3 29.5
Basic electronic material 13.0 3.7 8.4 27.1 -9.4 18.7
Radio, television, sound and video 14.6 5.8 13.9 53.0 -8.7 39.1
Optical, photographic and cinematographic apparatus 15.3 8.2 12.7 44.2 -7.1 31.5
Vehicle cabins, chassis and trailers 78.4 51.8 3.7 20.0 -26.6 16.4
Furniture items 50.9 39.6 8.8 20.2 -11.3 11.3
Source: Global Trade Information Services (gtis). 
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TABLE 7
Bolivarian republic of venezuela: Share and a variation in the share of imports  
from Brazil and China in total imports by selected subsectors, 2004 and 2009
(Percentages)
Subsectors
Brazil China Variation of Share
2004 2009 2004 2009 Brazil China
Fabrics, including yarn and fabric 9.1 4.2 22.1 29.3 -4.9  7.2
Footwear 11.1 8.6 4.9 25.7 -2.5 20.8
Wood products, cork and braided material , except furniture 37.8 27.3 7.0 18.4 -10.5 11.4
Continuous fibres, yarns, cables and filaments, artificial and 
synthetic
5.8 1.4 1.5 24.8 -4.4 23.3
Glass and products of glass 14.3 5.6 3.1 22.9 -8.7 19.8
Tanks, boilers and metallic deposits 9.2 1.8 4.4 13.0 -7.4 8.6
Machine-tools 12.8 7.1 4.4 16.4 -5.7 12.0
Machinery and equipment used for mineral extraction and 
construction
22.2 14.3 3.1 11.8 -7.9 8.7
Other machinery and equipment of specific use 15.9 9.5 2.6 9.9 -6.4 7.3
Electrical appliances 6.6 3.4 9.2 19.5 -3.2 10.3
Lamps and lighting equipment 8.7 1.5 21.9 44.8 -7.2 22.9
Other transport equipment 2.6 0.3 23.7 50.0 -2.3 26.3
Furniture items 8.3 7.2 8.4 26.2 -1.1 17.8
Source: Global Trade Information Services (gtis).
FIGURE 7
Herfindahl-Hirschman index of sector concentration of Chinese  
and Brazilian exports to Latin America, 1995-2008
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of textile products (15.3%); preparation of leather 
and manufacture of leather articles, travel articles 
and footwear (7.9%); and machinery and equipment 
(7.1%). By 2008, in contrast, the four leading export 
sectors to Latin America were the manufacture of 
electronic material and communications apparatus 
and equipment (12.1%); machinery and equipment 
(10.8%); manufacture of chemical products (8.7%); and 
manufacture of textile products (8.2%). In other words, 
as the share of labour-intensive activities decreases, the 
importance of manufactures produced by specialized 
suppliers and r&d-intensive products increases. 
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To analyse these findings in greater depth, the trade 
complementarity index (tci) was calculated for Chinese 
and Brazilian trade with Latin American countries, again 
remembering that indicators relating to that region do 
not include Brazil. The tci between the two regions is 
obtained by comparing the export basket of country i to 
the world at large, with the total import basket of country 
j. For the purposes of this article, it is possible to verify 
the extent to which products exported by Brazil and 
China worldwide coincide with the products imported 
by Latin American countries. The tci is calculated using 
the following formula, where the sector characterization 
used to calculate the share in total imports and exports 





















Where: mk,j = Represents imports of sector k in the total 
imports of country j; xk,i = represents exports of sector 
k in the total exports of country i. 
A tci of zero means that there is no complementarity 
between the imports and exports of the regions analysed, 
whereas if the indicator has a value of a 100, it means 
that the schedules are perfectly complementary; i.e. 
the country in question exports precisely what the 
other country wants to import.20 Figure 8 shows the 
dynamic of the tci for China and Brazil with respect 
to Latin America. 
In the reference period, China’s tci with Latin 
American countries increased, while Brazil’s tci with 
those countries declined. Although a tci value above 50 
points indicates a high level of complementarity, in 2008 
China’s complementarity with Latin America was greater 
than Brazil’s, because the indicators for the two countries 
in 1994 were 47.6 and 56.9 respectively. The subsectors 
recording an increase in the tci of China’s exports and 
Latin America’s imports include the manufacture of 
optical, photographic and cinematographic apparatus, 
instruments and materials, for which the index rose 
from 46.6 in 1994 to 87.5 in 2008. This increase in 
complementarity stems from annual average growth 
of over 35% in China’s exports from that subsector 
to Latin American countries in the years studied. The 
value exported by the Chinese economy to the region 
thus reached a level of US$1.5 billion in the last year 
considered. 
The tci of the ceramics manufacturing subsector 
rose by 36.1 points between 1994 and 2008, reaching 
a level of 59.0, representing an increase in the share 
20 See Hoekman, Mattoo and English (2002) for further details. 
FIGURE 8
Trade complementarity index between Brazil and Latin America  
and between China and Latin America, 1994-2008
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of that subsector’s imports from China from 3.8% to 
28.2% with respect to total Latin American imports in 
that subsector. Moreover, there was an increase of over 
32 points in China’s tci with Latin American countries, 
in relation to the electric energy distribution and control 
equipment manufacture subsector, which in 2008 attained 
a level of 76.6. 
Thus far, the analysis has focused on the general 
features of the Brazilian and Chinese export baskets to 
Latin America, highlighting the sectors and subsectors 
considered most important. The next indicator to be 
reviewed involves a subsector approach, defining annual 
gains and losses of a set of subsectors present in Brazilian 
and Chinese exports to Latin American countries. 
This method of analysis is based on the hypothesis 
that a country’s share in world markets should remain 
constant through time. The difference between export 
growth defined by that constant share standard and 
the observed export performance is attributed to the 
competitiveness effect; and real export growth is divided 
into competitiveness, export basket composition, and 
market distribution effects (Leamer and Stern, 1970, 
p. 171). For that purpose, the competitiveness effect 
measure (ce) is used, which relates changes in the 
market share and value exported from Brazil and China 
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share of country j in the imports of country i of sector 
k in the initial period (t-1); and Mi w t
k
, ,
 = total value of 
imports of country i of sector k in the final period t. 
The competitiveness effect is calculated as the 
difference between the value actually exported by each 
subsector from the Chinese and Brazilian economies in 
the last year analysed, and the value that should have 
been exported for each country to maintain the same 
market shares in the initial year of the analysis. Thus, if 
the competitiveness effect is equal to zero, it means that 
there was no competitiveness gain. The competitiveness 
effect will be used to measure the net gain or loss of 
competitiveness of the exports of each Brazilian and 
Chinese subsector to Latin America.21 It would also be 
possible to review the product and market effects on 
changes in sector shares, but the competitiveness effect 
is sufficient for the specific purpose of comparing the 
performance of Chinese and Brazilian exports. 
Table 8 shows the competitiveness effect for selected 
subsectors. Those subsectors were defined on the basis 
of choosing those showing a net average competitiveness 
 
21 See Leamer and Stern (1970); Batista (2002). 
TABLE 8
Gain and loss of competitiveness of selected sectors of Brazilian  
and Chinese exports to Latin America, 1994-2008 and 2003-2008
(Thousands of dollars per year)
Country Subsector
China Brazil
1994-2008 2003-2008 1994-2008 2003-2008
br Extraction of oil and natural gas 8 -147 121 942 207 429
br Livestock -241 -846 30 363 77 845
br Slaughtering and preparation of meat and fish products 9 404 14 644 25 024 -8 949
br Tractors and machinery and equipment for agriculture 4 103 9 666 22 403 10 579
br Soaps, detergents, cleaning products and perfume articles 5 093 7 265 21 977 33 016
br Dairy products 1 384 3 836 17 270 45 550
br Construction, assembly and repair of aircraft 177 67 14 474 21 165
br Seasonal crops 2 093 -23 802 13 302 5 599
br Production of alcohol 0.00 -0.04 12 835 28 334
br./ch Automobiles, trucks and utility vehicles 20 983 55 648 182 257 62 840
br./ch Pesticides 23 701 38 549 13 261 37 587
br./ch Non-ferrous metal metallurgy 31 254 63 946 28 019 62 699
br./ch Machinery and equipment for use in mineral extraction and construction 33 991 85 410 19 732 -15 981
br./ch Insulated electric wires, cables and conductors 51 640 97 325 10 303 22 656
Continues overleaf
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1994-2008 2003-2008 1994-2008 2003-2008
br./ch Inorganic chemical products 62 379 109 232 13 670 23 164
br./ch Footwear 64 707 43 321 12 495 -20 315
br./ch Pharmaceuticals 127 422 258 534 14 349 -22 359
br./ch Telephony, radio telephony and television and radio transmission 508 102 1 135 711 137 401 211 079
br./ch Construction and repair of ships 12 933 35 239 14 474 21 165
ch Professional safety clothing accessories 11 772 27 313 31 204
ch Fibres, wires, cables and continuous filaments, artificial and synthetic 10 060 25 231 -498 -6 127
ch Office machinery 15 045 12 003 3 421 11 244
ch Products of wood, cork and braided material – except furniture 16 409 34 770 -4 284 -291
ch Electrical material for vehicles - except batteries 18 212 43 055 2 269 34 570
ch Miscellaneous chemical products and preparations 20 064 25 284 -10 103 -8 317
ch Resins and elastomers 20 872 45 757 -28 650 3 946
ch Measurement, testing and control apparatus and instrumentsa 22 238 45 449 -1 689 5 503
ch Glass and glass products 23 803 41 828 2 364 14 271
ch Trucks and buses 24 163 65 109 -18 779 113 127
ch Other electrical equipment and apparatus 27 232 44 297 -2 540 4 522
ch Instruments for medical-hospital useb 18 814 40 748 -378 8 698
ch Equipment for distribution and control of electric energy 27 319 51 905 -4 131 14 290
ch Electric batteries and accumulators 30 651 51 942 3 124 16 465
ch Textile articles made from fabrics - except clothing 30 934 70 335 7 124 28 406
ch Machinery-tools 32 850 66 920 3 614 2 560
ch Tubes - except iron and steel 35 126 85 877 9 778 34 031
ch Woollen fabrics and articles 38 251 61 283 -9 609 2 648
ch Ceramic products 38 334 82 600 666 1 285
ch Travel articles and miscellaneous leather articles 39 109 46 725 1 830 6 885
ch Metalwork articles and instruments, locks and manual tools 44 051 91 996 -7 021 21 968
ch Furniture items 48 196 93 608 7 410 28 976
ch Other machinery and equipment of specific use 48 760 111 798 5 892 18 391
ch Organic chemical products 50 500 59 900 -22 396 23 443
ch Spare parts and accessories for motor vehicles 55 711 136 154 -124 549 270 715
ch Fabrics - including yarn and fabric 58 492 110 611 4 454 6 899
ch Lamps and lighting equipment 58 511 71 484 -2 461 -1 481
ch Motors, pumps, compressors and transmission equipment 78 693 142 070 -3 026 55 897
ch Miscellaneous metal products 82 944 172 942 -367 33 517
ch Other transport equipment 84 334 108 130 7 655 4 778
ch Electrical appliances 85 983 130 241 -2 803 -22 110
ch Plastic products 89 971 172 458 2 847 47 048
ch Optical, photographic and cinematographic apparatus 91 916 114 099 -6 059 -8 273
ch Garment manufacture 96 984 154 763 -2 625 -1 039
ch Machinery and equipment of general use 116 118 252 846 -12 695 9 604
ch Electrical generators, transformers and motors 116 438 206 431 -5 565 45 015
ch Iron and steel 117 106 315 229 -76 199 411
ch Basic electronic material 182 325 270 257 -10 083 -8 248
ch Radio, television, sound and video 424 964 458 761 8 269 -40 883
ch Electronic system equipment for data processing 580 361 640 900 433 -5 275
Total - all subsectors 4 445 013 7 428 127 110 019 1 768 881
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Database (comtrade).
a Except equipment used in the control of industrial processes. 




thE PERfoRmAnCE of ChInEsE And bRAzILIAn ExPoRts to LAtIn AmERICA, 1994-2009  • 
mARCos tAdEu CAPutI LéLIs, AndRé moREIRA CunhA And mAnuELA gomEs dE LImA
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 6  •  A P R I L  2 0 1 2
gain of more than US$10 million per year, considering 
the change between the years 1994 and 2008, referred 
to as long period. The “country” column indicates the 
country to which the subsector belongs. A second period 
of analysis from 2003 to 2008 is referred to as the “short 
period”, because, as shown above, in 2003 there was 
a change in the trend of Brazilian exports to America. 
An analysis of the long period shows that nine 
subsectors produced exclusive competitiveness gains for 
Brazilian exports, 11 subsectors recorded competitiveness 
gains in amounts above US$10 million per year in 
both countries, and 40 subsectors were defined by 
competitiveness gains for Chinese exports. This result 
shows the competitive superiority of China’s exports to 
Latin American countries, compared to Brazil’s exports to 
the same destinations. China’s net total competitiveness 
gain in the long period, including subsectors that are 
not identified in table 8, amounts to US$4,445 million 
per year, translating into a net gain of US$62.2 billion 
over the entire period analysed. In contrast, the net 
total competitiveness gain of Brazilian exports to Latin 
America amounted to US$110 million per year, for a 
cumulative value of US$1.5 billion. The superiority of 
China’s exports to the region is clear when comparing 
the results, because their competitiveness gain is 40 times 
higher than that of Brazil’s exports to the same group 
of countries. The reader is reminded that this superior 
performance model of China’s exports had been defined 
in the indicator series shown above.
On the other hand, there has been a considerable 
improvement in the net total competitiveness gain of 
Brazilian exports in the short period, in other words 
since 2003. Between 2003 and 2008, this value 
amounted to US$1,769 million per year, for a cumulative 
value of US$8.9 billion. Despite this recovery in the 
competitiveness of Brazil’s exports to Latin American 
countries, the total net competitiveness gain for China 
was even higher, reaching a level of US$7,428 million 
per year, or a cumulative US$37.1 billion over the short 
period. This shows that the total net competitiveness gain 
for China’s exports to Latin America in the long period 
was well distributed, and that 67% of those gains were 
obtained in the short period. The characterization of 
Brazilian exports shows that total net competitiveness 
gains were heavily concentrated in the short period. 
The nine subsectors selected for exclusive 
competitiveness gains by Brazilian exports display a 
concentration in natural-resource-intensive activities. 
The subsector recording the largest competitiveness 
gain in the long period was oil and gas extraction, and 
the gain was intensified in the short period. In this 
group of nine subsectors, the only ones not relating to 
natural resource intensive products are the following: 
Tractors and machinery and equipment agriculture; 
Construction, assembly and repair of aircraft; and soaps, 
detergents, cleaning products and perfume articles. It 
is worth noting that the first subsector mentioned is 
formed by multinationals, whereas the second is based 
on performance of a single enterprise. 
An analysis of the nine selected subsectors shows 
that the competitiveness of Brazilian exports compared 
to Chinese exports to Latin America is increasing in 
natural-resource-intensive subsectors, the manufacture 
of tractors and agricultural implements, and in the 
aviation sector. Since 2003 there has been a recovery in 
the competitiveness of the automotive chain, including 
parts and accessories manufacture. In the other 
subsectors —mainly electro-electronics, machinery and 
labour-intensive equipment— China is clearly more 
competitive. In other words, Brazilian exports have 
become more competitive than those of China in just 
10 of the 60 subsectors listed in table 8. The capacity of 
the Chinese economy to diversify and add value to its 
export basket for Latin America, shown in this subsector-
competitiveness model, had been noted above when 
reviewing the external sales of that country worldwide.
IV
Final comments
This article has reviewed Chinese and Brazilian 
export performance of in Latin America. It started 
by evaluating the importance of the external sector in 
China’s growth dynamic, and showed that gfcf has 
contributed more than net exports to gdp growth. As 
argued in the section II, however, this does not mean 
that exports are unimportant. 
The analysis showed that the trend of China’s exports 
of industrialized products to Latin America outpaced the 
Brazilian equivalent. This divergence becomes more 
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accentuated as from 2005, despite an increase in the 
growth rate of Brazilian exports from industrial sectors 
to Latin American countries in 2003. Nonetheless, the 
trend of China’s industrial exports to Latin America, 
in value terms, has outpaced the equivalent indicator 
for Brazilian exports since the second quarter of 2007. 
Moreover, related to the virtuous dynamic of the trend of 
China’s exports to Latin American countries, the share of 
imports from China in Latin America’s total imports has 
grown, and trade intensity has also increased between 
the two regions. In contrast, the share of imports from 
Brazil in the total imports of Latin American countries 
stagnated between 1994 and 2008, as did Brazil’s trade 
intensity index (tii) with Latin America. 
In terms of the quality of China’s exports to Latin 
America, a sectoral deconcentration process has been 
unfolding, along with an increase in the relative share of 
higher value-added sectors during the years analysed in 
this article. This deconcentration of external sales from 
the Chinese economy to Latin America was not merely 
sectoral, because from 2004 on a deconcentration trend 
has been visible in China’s exports to its three main 
Latin American partners. In counterpart, the sectoral 
concentration of Brazil’s exports to Latin America has 
increased slightly, with a heavy concentration of those 
exports in South American countries, particularly in 
Argentina. 
The superior performance of China’s exports to Latin 
America compared with those of Brazil is also reflected 
in those two countries’ TCIs with the Latin American 
region —increasing in China’s trade with Latin America 
but decreasing in the case of Brazil. At the subsector 
level, Brazilian exports have become more competitive 
basically in natural-resource intensive sectors; tractors 
and agricultural equipment; and aviation, while the 
automotive chain staged a recovery between 2003 and 
2008. In all other sectors, Chinese exports has shown a 
clear advantage. This resulted in a net competitiveness 
gain for Chinese exports to Latin America that is 40 
times greater than the same indicator for the Brazilian 
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